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THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE SUPREME
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitionei,

Case No.

v.

i

BRIAN E. MAGUIRE,

t . ' C a t e y t n } I" Il

I 3

De f endant-Re sponden t
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
question presented for review Is whether the
court of appeals erroneously heiu

, late v. Gibbont- , 4 0 i" 2d

1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strit^ compliance" with rulf u
Utah Rules

I (""i mui

I ll-'i ncedio

hirli supersedes the

"record as a whole" test traditionally appljeMi
c>

if

m iMn'iew •

whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily

entered.
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on November
16, 1990, and appears i i :t State v Mag aire •, 1 » 900045-CA (Utar
App. Nov. 16 f 199C

mpublished) (a copj c f the court ,»•» op
addendum).
JURISDICTION UF I'HIS CUUkT

This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under utau .,„( Jt," A,

t

n ? •• ? ( < | ' «'! |S»rr. 1990). .
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 21, 1988, defendant was charged with
aggravated assault, a third degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 75-5-103 (1990); mayhem, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1990); and being a
habitual criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1990)(R. 31). On March 4, 1988, defendant
pleaded not guilty to all charges.

On April 21, 1988, defendant

executed an affidavit and entered a no contest plea to the charge
of aggravated assault (R. 111-12); (transcript of plea hearing
(hereinafter "T.") 8). The other two charges were withdrawn on
the same date (T. 9). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the
prosecution recommended to the trial court that defendant be
sentenced for the offense as a class A misdemeanor (T. 11). The
trial court accepted the prosecution's recommendation and
sentenced defendant to one year in the Salt Lake County Jail with
credit for 30 days served (T. 14-15).

Defendant chose to serve

i

his sentence at the Utah State Prison (T. 15), and he completed
his term on or about March 22, 1989.

Defendant filed a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea on August 10, 1988 (R. 124-29).

On

i

November 30, 1989, a hearing was held on defendant's motion, and
on December 1, 1989 the trial court denied the motion (R. 24143).

The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of

law, and signed the order on December 15, 1989 (R. 256-60).

Judge James S. Sawaya presided over defendant's guilty plea
proceeding but recused himself after defendant filed his motion
to withdraw the plea (R. 217). The case was reassigned to Judge
Richard H. Moffat.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Criminal Procedure.
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acts he committed which gave rise
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treated a no contest plea the same as a guilty plea (Ld.); and
that the court was not bound by the prosecution's recommendation
concerning sentencing (T. 5). Defendant stated that he had read
and understood the affidavit he was signing and the rights,
elements of the crime and facts giving rise to the charges, as
set forth in that affidavit (T. 6-7). Defendant also testified
that he understood the penalties for the offense of a third
degree felony and that he was signing the affidavit of his own
free will without force, coercion or threat (T. 5,8). After
signing the affidavit, defendant entered a no contest plea (Id.).
Defendant waived the statutory time limit for
sentencing and was sentenced, as recommended by the prosecution,
to a term of one year with a credit of 30 days, as though he had
pleaded no contest to a class A misdemeanor charge (T. 9, 14).
In a discussion regarding defendant's sentencing, defendant's
counsel, with defendant present, discussed defendant's parole
status.

She stated, in pertinent part,

,f

[t]he Board of Pardons

will have to consider some technical matters, violations as well
as this new conviction, and they will no doubt give him some more
time than that [referring to the class A misdemeanor sentence]
. . . " (T. 11).
At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his
plea, defendant testified that he had not read the affidavit he
had signed at the time of his plea (transcript of hearing on
motion to withdraw plea (hereinafter "TA.") 49) but admitted to
having testified to the contrary at the plea hearing (TA. 51-52).
He testified to his belief that he was entering a contract with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the "Executive Branch" of the Utah State government and that any
agreement he made in his plea was binding on both the county
attorney and Adult Probation and Parole, as agents of the
"Executive Branch" (TA. 53-54).

Defendant also asserted, without

offering documentary or other evidence, that his parole from the
Utah State Prison was revoked solely as a result of the
conviction arising from his no contest plea (TA. 54). He stated
that he was coerced into entering the plea (TA. 57). Defendant
did not testify to and no other evidence was offered asserting
any deficiencies in the taking of the no contest plea.
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court
concluded, inter alia, that defendant's plea was entered
knowingly and voluntarily and that the State of Utah had kept
good faith with defendant and delivered each of its promises made
to defendant up through sentencing (R. 258).
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
STATE V. GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987) f
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
On appeal defendant asserted several bases for
reversing the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his
no contest plea.

First, in response to the court of appeals'

holding in State v. Vasilacopulosf 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), defendant stated that
the trial court improperly applied the "record as a whole"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

analysis in determining the validity of his plea.

The State

responded that, under the "record as a whole" test traditionally
applied by this Court on post-conviction review of the validity
of a guilty plea, the record clearly supported the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion. See, e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 784
P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990); State
v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d
403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).3
In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea, the court of appeals rejected the State's
argument, continuing to conclude that this Court in State v.
Gibbons replaced the "record as a whole" test with a strict rule
11 compliance test.

Maguiref Case No. 900045-CA at 3.

The court

of appeals decision misconstrues Gibbons and ignores significant
language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons opinions of this
Court.
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial

i

court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas.

Rather, the

Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on

(

o
Because the court of appeals reversed on the basis of lack of
on-the record strict compliance with rule 11, it did not reach
the merits of defendant's other arguments.
i

3

The "record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows:
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is
not critical so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving.
718 P.2d at 405.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that
M

a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in

all trial courts in this state is appropriate."
P.2d at 1312.

Gibbons, 740

It then set out the specific requirements for

taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the
defendant's pleas.

Ibid.

The Gibbons Court did not even mention

the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a
guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious: the Court was not
reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness
of the defendant's pleas. Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion
that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons.

The Gibbons

Court simply did not address that issue.
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a
whole test was not modified by Gibbons.

For example, in Jolivet

v. Cook, this Court stated:
We first address Jolivet's claim that his
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary.
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas
because he did not make findings that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how those elements related to the facts,
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he
did not know or understand these things when
he entered his pleas.
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a
trial
court
accepts
a guilty
plea,
must
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben
Clark Lawit
School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

find that the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he or she is entering the plea* In Gibbons,
this Court stated that in making this
findingf the trial court must ensure that the
defendant understands "the elements of the
crimes charged and the relationship of the
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea,
it must find that the defendant knows of the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences. The record clearly shows that at
the time the guilty pleas were accepted,
Judge Burns did not make the findings
required by [rule 11(5) ], i.e., that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how these elements related to the facts
and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences.
However, this Court has held, "[T]he absence
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical
so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving." State v. Miller, 718
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris,
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v.
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985).
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted).

In State v. Copeland,

the Court, without citing Gibbons, said:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173
(emphasis in the original). We think the
most effective way to do this is to have the
defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
Digitized by the Howard W.We
Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clarkrecord
Law School, BYU.
voluntariness.
hold
that
the
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\

i

i

demonstrates that defendant admitted acts
sufficient to justify his conviction of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty.
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons
guilty pleas, this Court did not note or attach any significance
to that fact in either opinion, and, in factf directly applied
Gibbons in Jolivet in concluding that although the trial court
did not strictly comply with rule 11, the record as a whole
demonstrated that Jolivet entered his guilty pleas knowingly and
voluntarily.

Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously

undermines the court of appeals' effort to distinguish Jolivet
and Copeland on the basis that the record as a whole test was
applied in those cases because they involved pre-Gibbons guilty
pleas.4

Significantly, in State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah

1989), which involved a post-Gibbons guilty plea, this

Court

appeared to apply the record as a whole test in reversing the
5
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw.
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction
It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet
and should not be followed.
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in , and
stating directly in State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 38
n.6 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990), that Smith applied the
"strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986):
A final word on the State's Rule 11
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that
was struck, the State has argued, in effect,
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty
pleas should always be voided when the trial
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well.
This position is shortsighted, for to follow
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse
than the wrong. If we were to hold any
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the
resultant plea, even when the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendant's, convicted and
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their
convictions for purely tactical reasons,
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas
corpus long after the fact. We have refused
to overturn convictions upon such challenges
in the past, e.g.f State v. Knowles, Utah,
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah,
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no
reason to encourage such attacks in the
future.
Overturning such convictions—which we
would have to do if we embraced the rationale
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion—would require the State
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably
long after the challenged guilty pleas were
entered and when the passage of time would
make reprosecution impractical, if not
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate
result would be to free a number of convicted
persons for nothing more that technical
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary
guilty pleas.
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . In so ruling, this
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See,
e.g., United States v. Barryf 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990)
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court adopted the harmless error rule in assessing rule 11
errors, a rule long recognized by this Court in a variety of
contexts.

See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989)

(harmless error standard for nonconstitutional error); State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with respect to
certain constitutional errors, we must place on the State the
burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt").

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a);

Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a
whole test with a strict compliance test.

A strict compliance

test is not required either by Gibbons or logic.
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court.
P. 46(b).

Utah R. App.

Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on

review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court

Cont. S.E.2d 520 (Ga. App. 1989) (where defendant was
otherwise informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is
applied to trial court's failure to comply with rule governing
taking of pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448
N.W.2d 781, 783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a whole"
demonstrated that plea was made knowingly and voluntarily);
People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983)
(voluntariness of plea determined by considering all relevant
circumstances surrounding it, not by judge's ritualistic
recitation of rights waived).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of appeals has decided an important question of law which should
be settled by this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) or (d),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _±

day of December, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

Q
^JUDITH S. H. ATHERTON
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Brian E.
Maguire, pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah
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of December, 1990.
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FILED

u-

w l

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

M«ryT Noon*n

># Ciwk ol »• Court
Uterh C#urt #t Appeals

ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)
Case No. 900045-CA

v.
Brian Maguire,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(November 16, 1990)

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals from a denial of a motion to withdraw a
no contest plea to aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990).
On April 21, 1988, defendant entered a no contest plea to
one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. In
exchange for the no contest plea, the prosecution agreed to
move for dismissal of a charge of mayhem, a second degree
felony, and a charge of being a habitual criminal, which allows
enhancement to a first degree felony, and to recommend that
defendant be sentenced for a class A misdemeanor. The charges
resulted from an incident in which defendant allegedly
assaulted his grandmother, ripping off part of her ear and
inflicting other injuries.
At the hearing on defendant's change of plea to no
contest, defendant signed a form affidavit, with handwritten
additions, which set forth rights that would be waived by entry
of the plea. The transcript of the hearing reflects that the
defendant was informed by the trial court that by virtue of his
prior not guilty plea, he was presumed innocent until he had
been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that the state
had the burden of proving each element of each crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt; that defendant had a right to a
trial by jury; that the court treated a no contest plea the
same as a guilty plea for purposes of sentencing; and that the
court would not be bound by the prosecution's recommendation
concerning sentencing.
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Although the trial court next questioned defendant about
his understanding of the affidavit, the record reflects no
specific discussion of the rights against compulsory
self-incrimination or the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him. The court asked defendant if he was
aware of the possible sentence for a third degree felony and
defendant responded affirmatively; however, the court did not
advise defendant of the minimum and maximum sentences.
Defendant contended in support of the motion to withdraw
his plea that the trial court failed to strictly comply with
the requirements of Rule 11(5), as required by State v.
fiUbbjans, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). Defendant further
contended that the facts set forth in the affidavit did not
satisfy the statutory elements of the offense.* Defendant's
final contention is that he was deprived of the benefit of the
plea bargain, i.e., sentencing to a class A misdemeanor,
because he was not advised that the conviction would result in
a revocation of parole on two prior convictions.
On appeal, the defendant makes the same arguments that
were asserted in the trial court and also challenges the
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the
motion to withdraw. Our determination of the issues raised
under Utah R. Crim. P. 11 is dispositive of the appeal, making
it unnecessary to consider defendant's claim that the
prosecution or the trial court was obligated to advise him of
the effect of the plea on his parole status. We find the
challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to
be wholly without merit.
The state concedes "that the trial court did not conduct
the complete on-the-record review with defendant of the rule
11(e) requirements as mandated by" State v. Vasilacopulos, 756
P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. £enie£, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1988); State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(per curiam); State v. Gentry. 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct,
App. 1990) and State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep, 35 (Utah

1. Utah R. Crim* P. ll(5)(d) requires that the trial court
find "the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which he is entering the plea." Defendant does not
specifically address Rule 11 in his argument that the elements
of the offense were not established.
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Ct. App. 1990).2 The State urges this court to reverse its
prior holdings that a trial court must strictly comply with
Rule 11 in accepting a guilty plea, which we decline to do.
State v. Pharris is dispositive of the issues raised in this
case. We conclude that the trial court did not review with the
defendant on the record each of the requirements of Rule 11 and
that the motion to withdraw should have been granted.
We find that the trial court failed to strictly comply
with Rule 11 and Gibbons, and we vacate defendant's conviction
and remand to the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw
his no contest plea.
ALL CONCUR:

Norma

Russell W. Bench, Judge*

?**z~
Gregory ^ T Orme, Judge

2. The State contends that the Court of Appeals decisions
cited above incorrectly interpret State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987) as requiring strict compliance with Rule 11
requirements. Thus, the State continues to make this argument
in order to preserve the issue for possible certiorari review.
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